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Abstract  
Voluntary certification programs are one type of intervention used to incentivize the 
commodity agricultural sector in tropical forest landscapes to reduce deforestation and 
improve sustainability. These programs encourage supply-chain actors to produce and source 
products according to agreed standards. We review the cases of the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) voluntary certification program in Indonesia, and the 
Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) voluntary certification program for cattle in Brazil. 
Based on field interviews, we explore the challenges faced by these programs to 
simultaneously sustain the rigor of their standards and boost producer participation. Taken 
together, we consider that rigor and participation are the principle components of a program’s 
sustainability impact. Given the high level of contention that often surrounds certification 
standards, we suggest that the other core activities (including adoption, implementation, and 
monitoring and enforcement) of certification programs are under-utilized places for 
generating benefits to producers that bypass the complex politics surrounding standards 
setting. We further identify a common progression from capacity building to full compliance 
for most producers. This trend suggests a need to design programs to maintain or increase the 
rigor of program standards in tandem with deliberate efforts to provide producers with 
additional benefits. In particular, providing benefits to producers at earlier points in their 
progression towards full compliance may attract additional producers to the program. Clear 
and objective expectations of producers at each stage in their progression towards full 
compliance also may benefit external stakeholders interested in tracking more granularly the 
progress of producers and the overall impact of certification programs.    
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1. Context 
Oil palm cultivation and cattle ranching are closely associated with tropical deforestation and 
other adverse environmental outcomes (Bustamante et al., 2012; Walker et al., 2004; Wilcove 
& Koh, 2010). Indonesia is the world’s leading producer of oil palm, and Brazil has the 
world’s largest commercial herd of beef cattle (Bustamante et al., 2012; USDA, 2010). From 
1990-2005, more than 50% of oil palm expansion in Indonesia resulted in deforestation (Koh 
& Wilcove, 2008). Similarly, Brazil slaughters over 200 million heads of cattle each year 
(FAO Stat, 2013), and is the largest exporter of cattle products globally. Brazil’s cattle 
industry may be responsible for up to 70% of deforestation that occurs within the country 
each year (Bustamante et al., 2012). 
Voluntary certification programs are one type of market governance intervention that has 
emerged in commodity sectors with high pressure on natural resources (Auld et al., 2008; 
Bass et al., 2001; Klooster, 2005; Steering Committee, 2012). Voluntary certification 
programs respond to the emergence of an alternative market based on demand for commodity 
products sourced with greater environmental and social sustainability (Smith & Maser, 2010; 
Taylor, 2005). Voluntary certification programs set minimum acceptable criteria for the 
production and processing of commodity products within agreed parameters of sustainable 
practices (Klooster, 2005). Most best management practices prescribed by voluntary 
certification programs target the production stage (Bitzer et al., 2008), since this is where the 
majority of threats to sustainability, including deforestation, occur (Cashore, 2004; 
Gulbrandsen, 2005; Overdevest, 2004). Civil society groups use compliance with voluntary 
certification programs to track the behavior of supply-chain actors. Consumers who wish to 
make more informed purchasing decisions also rely on voluntary certification programs to 
verify the sustainability of retail products (Tallontire, 2007). 
The availability of a price premium for certified sustainable agricultural products can have a 
strong influence over whether a voluntary certification program is able to attract a large and 
diverse pool of participants who support rigorous standards (Eden, 2009; Henson & Reardon, 
2005; Klooster, 2010). However, less attention has been paid to the means by which 
voluntary certification programs generate other benefits for participating producers as well as 
other stakeholders whose participation in and acceptance of the standard lend it credibility 
(Overdevest & Rickenbach, 2006). Other benefits include risk management, brand protection, 
better management practices that can lead to production efficiencies, and access to finance 
and new markets (Cashore et al., 2003; Fulponi, 2006; Overdevest & Rickenbach, 2006; 
Tallontire, 2007; Prakash & Potoski, 2012; Rickenbach & Overdevest, 2006; van Kooten, 
2005). 
This paper investigates the extent to which voluntary certification programs are designed to 
incentivize participation by a large number of producers. We consider incentives that may 
include other benefits than a direct price premium for products. We categorize the design of 
voluntary certification programs into four activities, based on the literature (see Gulbrandsen, 
2005; Henson & Humphrey, 2010; Raynolds et al., 2007; Scarlat & Dallemand, 2011; von 
Geibler, 2013, Milder et al., 2014). These four activities are: standards setting, adoption, 
implementation, and monitoring and enforcement. Maintaining or increasing the rigor of 
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standards is of primary interest to many of the stakeholders outside the commodity supply 
chain. We review the design choices made in the other core activities (i.e., adoption, 
monitoring and implementation) of voluntary certification programs as possible opportunities 
to entice producers without compromising the rigor of the standard.  
1.1. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil certification program 
Concerns about severe sustainability issues associated with palm oil gave rise to a global 
multi-stakeholder governance initiative, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). The 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Unilever organized a conference in 2003, bringing together 
200 participants from 16 countries to address these concerns (RSPO, 2012). In 2004, the 
RSPO was officially established; its mission is to “transform markets to make sustainable 
palm oil the norm” (RSPO, 2012). In 2007, the RSPO certification program was launched, 
leveraging the existing governance structure and membership of the RSPO (RSPO, 2012). 
The certification program establishes a set of standards—a set of 8 principles and 39 criteria 
(principles and criteria - P&C)—for producing, processing, distributing, and selling 
sustainable palm oil. The P&C address social, environmental and economic sustainability 
concerns. Social sustainability commitments include requirements to compensate local 
communities when companies acquire their land for development. The principle of free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC) governs such interactions between producers and local 
communities and indigenous groups. Environmental sustainability commitments include 
requirements to adopt better practices to maintain soil quality, control erosion, protect surface 
and ground water, and reduce risks associated with pest management. Producers are expected 
to mitigate negative impacts on biodiversity by protecting lands identified as high 
conservation value (HCV), in part by completing an environmental impact statement1. 
Producers also must commit to transparency and maintain compliance with applicable local 
and national laws and regulations. For some aspects of the standard, such as the requirement 
to maintain HCV areas within plantation property, RSPO principles may surpass what is 
required under local and national law 
Other core activities of the program include verification and enforcement of certified 
participants. To date, the RSPO certification program has certified 50 producers and accounts 
for 15% of palm oil production globally (RSPO, 2012). The RSPO certification program 
features four chain-of-custody levels for certified sustainable palm oil (CSPO), ranging from 
blends of certified and non-certified CSPO to a fully segregated product (RSPO, 2011). 
1.2. The Sustainable Agriculture Network certification program for 
cattle 
Formed in 2001, the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) is a coalition of independent 
non-profit conservation organizations whose aim is to promote the social and environmental 
sustainability of agricultural activities by developing high global standards and awarding the 
Rainforest Alliance seal for agricultural commodities such as coffee, cocoa, banana, fruits, 
chili, flowers, palm oil, and tea (Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010). The SAN 
Sustainable Cattle Production System Standard (hereafter, SAN cattle certification program) 
                                                 
1 In Indonesia, environmental impact statements are known as an AMDAL (Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan Hidup). 
  10 
was launched in 2010. The SAN cattle certification program combines the Sustainable 
Agriculture Standard (10 principles and 99 criteria used for all SAN agricultural 
commodities; created in 2008) and the Sustainable Cattle Production System Standard 
(additional 5 principles and 36 criteria, specifically relevant to cattle) (Sustainable Agriculture 
Network, 2010). Additional SAN standards include the Chain Of Custody Standard to certify 
non-producer actors such as slaughterhouses, Group Certification Standard to encourage 
community or co-op based certification and empower smallholder farmers, and the Climate 
Module to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (SAN, 2011).  
The goal of the SAN cattle certification program is to elevate the environmental and social 
sustainability of the cattle supply chain. The standards address environmental and social 
responsibility, including topics such as cattle management, pasture and soil management, 
animal welfare, and carbon footprint reduction. The standards require strict, annual audits and 
strive for continuous improvement. As of April 2014,  three farms and one slaughterhouse 
have been certified under the SAN cattle certification program (Sustainable Agriculture 
Network, 2010). The three farms— all owned by the same company—are now under a single 
group certification standard. The group scheme in the Sustainable Agriculture Network adds 
23 criteria; to receive this certification, all member farms of a group administrator have to 
comply with the standards.  
2. Methods  
We conducted semi-structured interviews in Indonesia and Brazil with key stakeholders in the 
palm oil and cattle supply chains, respectively, over a six-week period in each country (June-
July 2013 in Indonesia; July-August 2013 in Brazil). We conducted interviews with actors 
from the state sector, civil society (local and international NGOs), and market sector 
(producers, processors, and retailers), as well as program staff from the two standards. Please 
see. Please see Appendix 1 for a full list of interviewees. In Indonesia, we interviewed 30 
individuals and stakeholder organizations in the cities of Jakarta and Bogor and provinces of 
Riau (Kuantan Singingi and Pelalawan districts) and West Kalimantan (Pontianak and 
Sanggau districts), in English and Bahasa Indonesia. Site visits were made to two RSPO-
certified oil palm plantations in Sumatra and to both certified and non-certified growers, 
including smallholders, in West Kalimantan (Fig. 1).  
In Brazil, we interviewed 24 individuals and stakeholder organizations in the states of São 
Paulo (in the cities of Piracicaba and São Paulo) and Mato Grosso (Cuiabá, Tangara da Serra, 
Alta Floresta, and Sinop) (Fig. 1; Appendix 1). Most interviews were conducted in 
Portuguese. Site visits were made to one SAN-certified farm (Fazenda São Marcelo) and two 
non-certified farms in Mato Grosso (Fig. 1).  
Questions addressed interviewees’ perceptions of voluntary certification; financial and 
logistical issues related to adoption and implementation; the role of non-supply chain 
stakeholders and their influence on producers; the market for certified sustainable versions of 
the commodity product; and opinions about the design and structure of the program.  
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Figure 1. Location of field research sites and interviews conducted in Indonesia and 
Brazil (adapted from Alves-Pinto et al. 2013). 
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3. Results 
The design of the certification activities (standard setting, adoption, implementation, and 
monitoring and enforcement) offers a number of opportunities for certification programs to 
provide benefits to producers without undermining the rigor of standards.  
3.1. Standard setting 
 Standard setting refers to the development of principles, criteria, and indicators for 
guiding participants toward enhanced sustainability in their practices. Standards are used to 
link the actions of individual participants to the aggregate contributions that the voluntary 
certification program as a whole has on sector-wide sustainability. 
3.1.1. Governance 
Certification programs establish rules about which actors are empowered to direct the agenda 
of the program and set standards through their governance structures. In many cases, program 
designers and managers must consider how existing external market relationships, such as 
those between retailers and producers, influence the internal dynamics of the program. The 
degree of influence producers have over standards can dictate participation rates and the rigor 
of the standards. In turn, the governance structure of programs influences their perceived 
legitimacy by different stakeholders. 
The RSPO certification program is governed by the RSPO itself, which is a multi-stakeholder 
group. Members of the RSPO fall into seven categories of stakeholders: oil palm growers, 
palm oil processors or traders, consumer goods manufacturers, retailers, financial institutions, 
environmental NGOs, and social NGOs, though not all membership categories are 
represented proportionately (RSPO, 2012). Members have voting rights in the General 
Assembly (RSPO, 2012). A subset of the members is tasked by the Executive Board to design 
the P&C, and then all members can vote to approve them. 
The governance structure for the SAN certification program for cattle is similar in that it has 
members that make up a General Assembly, an executive committee, and a secretariat. Once 
every five years the standards are re-evaluated in a public consultation, where all interested 
parties and stakeholders can participate. The same process occurs during the development of 
the standards. Unlike the RSPO, the SAN is not organized as a roundtable, but rather as a 
consortium of civil society organizations. The International Standards Committee (ISC) 
provides input into determination for the SAN standards, including those for the SAN cattle 
certification program. The ISC is comprised of 12 elected independent members who are 
international experts and represent various stakeholder categories: academic, invited 
environmental NGOs that work in the agricultural sector, producer, technical, government, 
and industry (Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010).  
The two certification programs take differing approaches to determining who can influence 
the programs’ directions. Although a diverse group of stakeholders are represented in RSPO 
deliberations and decision-making, environmental and social NGOs have argued that the 
program standards reflect the disproportionate influence of a minority of market-sector 
stakeholder groups and are consequently not as rigorous as they ought to be. As a result, 
RSPO approves standards that are in close alignment with what industry actors consider to be 
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realistic in terms of cost and practicality. However, NGOs tend to emphasize the limits of this 
approach for making progress towards more rigorous environmental and social performance 
goals, such as aggressive reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In contrast, the 
SAN cattle program’s standards are more strongly influenced by a consortium of conservation 
NGOs. This has led to a standards-setting process with emphasis on high environmental and 
social standards. The program is widely accepted by civil society stakeholders as rigorous, 
but participation is still low. It could be that the SAN cattle program’s low participation rates 
are the result of its newness, but some supply-chain actors believe that the SAN cattle 
program does not reflect realistic potential capabilities, interests, or priorities of small and 
medium-sized producers, since they are far from being able to comply with the SAN criteria. 
Some producers continue to struggle to comply with national laws, which are less rigorous 
that the SAN standards.   
3.1.2. Sustainability standards 
P&C provide the details of a voluntary certification program’s standards, and are based on an 
overall set of goals for what the program is designed to accomplish in terms of influencing 
sustainability in the sector. In general, producers favor standards that are less rigorous. The 
large producers we interviewed had complex, expansive operations that become more 
difficult to certify if the standards are very rigorous. Small producers tend to lack the 
resources, capacity, and know-how to implement very rigorous standards. At both ends of the 
size spectrum, producers were interested in capturing additional market share and learning the 
operating efficiencies that are built into the standards, but only to the extent that the upfront 
costs and commitments were not too steep. Meanwhile, standards that are perceived as weak, 
lack the support of civil society groups and consumers, calling into question for potential 
participants the value of participating in the certification program. Therefore, ideally P&C 
should set standards that reach a level of rigor that is considered credible to external 
stakeholders, while allowing producers who have achieved certification to maintain a positive 
return on their investment. The relative proportions of practicality and rigor vary depending 
on the openness of the governance structure and which actors play a dominant role in the 
program (McDermott et al., 2013). 
Palm oil producers must follow the P&C in order to achieve RSPO certification for each 
plantation. To ensure long-term financial sustainability, producers must develop a business 
plan with a minimum three-year outlook. Each criterion identifies indicators, 45% of which 
are compulsory. Failure to comply with compulsory indicators results in major 
nonconformities, which prohibit the issuance of a certificate (RSPO, 2007). In cases where a 
producer owns or operates many plantations or subsidiary companies, a single plantation or 
subsidiary can be certified as having met the P&C, as verified by an auditor, even if other 
plantations have not yet met the standard (RSPO, 2013). The P&C of the RSPO certification 
are more widely accepted by producers, but also are often challenged by social and 
environmental NGOs who do not believe the standards are rigorous enough to have 
significant environmental or social impact. 
The standards of the SAN cattle certification program address a wide range of sustainable 
farm management issues. In Brazil, the SAN cattle certification program is more stringent in 
most categories than national laws. For example, the program requires producers to go 
beyond the national Forest Code (law no. 4.771) that governs forest conservation. To become 
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certified, a farm must comply with at least 50% of the criteria of each principle and 80% of 
the total criteria, including all critical criteria. Only when all producers and processors 
throughout the chain are certified do they become authorized to use the Rainforest Alliance 
Certified™ seal on their products. The P&C of the SAN certification program for cattle are 
rigorous and would likely change the practices of producers towards greater sustainability, 
but are perceived by producers as difficult to achieve. 
3.2. Adoption  
The adoption of a program by producers is critical to its success. The program administrators 
we interviewed confirmed that they made conscious decisions about which types of producers 
and buyers to target during the initial stages of their respective programs. For instance, the 
achievement of certification by producers who were previously unable to meet the standards, 
as is often the case for small- and medium-scale producers, is more impactful in terms of 
sustainability outcomes. But the journey for this type of producer towards compliance is often 
complex and can encounter financial constraints, as certification can be expensive. The 
administrators in some programs develop alternative requirements and special “group 
certifications” after the launch of a standards program. This delayed focus on small- and 
medium-sized players speaks to the ways in which standards programs are designed first and 
foremost for larger players, as well as the genuine nuances and complexities to engaging 
other actors who comprise only a small portion of the market share. Existing market 
relationships also favor the early participation of large producers. Large retailers often are the 
first to support voluntary standards because of the pressure NGOs and consumers place on 
them. In addition to choices about when to recruit the various producer classes, program 
designers may be faced with the situation that each class of producers demands different 
enticements in exchange for their participation. 
Large producers may be targeted early because they often represent a major portion of the 
market share for a commodity product, and their production processes often are already 
aligned closely with the best management practices required by certification programs. This 
producer class also tends to have the financial and information resources to implement new 
practices (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Cashore, 2004; Taylor, 2005; Fig. 3). Securing the 
participation of small producers can have the advantage of elevating the sustainability of a 
producer class that typically has more room for improvement in sustainability. However, 
whichever producer class is pursued first, increasing the diversity of participant types to 
capture the full spectrum of producers minimizes the risk that a program’s agenda is 
undermined by the priorities or exit of a few large participants (Taylor, 2005). 
Programs based on intensification and land sparing as a route to greater sustainability may 
offer such non-monetary benefits for participation as enhanced management and operations. 
The RSPO-certified firms we interviewed emphasized that the program offered a total 
management system for operating profitable and efficient plantations. Alternatively, 
companies operating internationally may use certification to standardize and coordinate 
complex, geographically diverse operations. More progressive producers embrace 
certification because it aligns with their existing core sustainability values that may not 
otherwise have been recognized by external stakeholders. Achieving certification also helps 
to highlight “sustainability hotspots,” or areas of concern within the industry, so that 
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producers can efficiently expend the resources they commit to sustainability. Finally, 
potential members are attracted to the program because it creates opportunities to access 
export markets, such as in the United States and Europe, and because the program’s best 
practices are increasingly demanded by financing institutions as a precondition for lending. 
The SAN cattle certification program initially strategically targeted cattle farms and 
slaughterhouses with existing commitments to sustainability. The Brazilian NGO member of 
SAN, Imaflora (Instituto de Manejo e Certificação Florestal e Agrícola), reached out early in 
the development of the program to Fazendas São Marcelo, one of the most socially and 
environmentally progressive farms in Brazil. Fazendas São Marcelo joined the program 
because the management and sustainability practices enabled them to reduce their operating 
cost and business risks, and the certification could yield a slightly higher sale price for their 
product. Moreover, the owner of Fazendas São Marcelo was known as being very progressive 
and thus saw certification as a strategy for getting ahead in the market. Prior to achieving 
certification, Fazendas São Marcelo had previously been certified for organic production and 
had adopted a corporate policy committed to no deforestation; both factors were helpful to the 
company as it sought SAN certification. For the certified slaughterhouse Marfrig, the cost and 
infrastructure needed to become SAN certified was relatively low, and SAN cattle 
certification positioned the company to enter premium beef markets, both domestically and 
internationally. Imaflora continues to pursue other large farms as participants in the SAN 
cattle certification program, but progress is slow ‒ in part because producers are unwilling to 
expend resources and change their practices to achieve the program’s rigorous requirements 
without a strong signal of consumer demand for certified sustainable beef products. 
If producers already have best practices in place prior to certification, their compliance costs 
are relatively low. In both the RSPO and SAN cases, motivation is greatest for large 
producers who have the resources to adopt a comprehensive sustainability management 
strategy and whose activities are also the most visible to civil society groups. Large producers 
are better able to overcome technical barriers to implementation because of the additional 
financial resources they can commit to the certification process. Meanwhile, producers who 
stand to benefit the most from certification struggle to adopt sustainability standards due to 
capacity constraints. 
3.3. Implementation 
The threshold for achieving certification varies depending on the rigor of the P&C and the 
rules of the program pertaining to implementation of the standard. Implementation 
requirements and the time-scale for producers to achieve certification are likely to affect 
program participation rates. The RSPO certification program features a (quasi-official) 
progression, with membership status in the roundtable acting as an intermediate milestone 
before actors achieve full certification. Membership status confers many of the privileges of 
full certification, including affiliation with the program and participation (e.g. voting rights) 
in the governance and administration of the program. The SAN cattle certification program 
awards certification after the rancher has fulfilled a minimum requirement of P&C for every 
unit of production under its management (Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010). It is easier 
to distinguish sustainable from non-sustainable products in programs with no intermediate 
steps (e.g., membership before certification), but such programs also delay the moment at 
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which producers can redeem benefits from their efforts. This may have negative 
consequences for the participation of producers who would be motivated by near-term 
benefits. 
Oil palm producers must become members of the RSPO roundtable before any of their 
plantations become fully certified. Member producers have to set time-bound plans to be 
certified by an RSPO-approved third-party certification body (CB) (RSPO, 2012). The time-
bound plan is a pledge that demonstrates a producer’s intent to certify all of its plantations 
before a specified year. Even if the majority of the subsidiaries are able to achieve 
certification with relative ease, one or two with outstanding land conflicts or particularly 
problematic environmental practices can delay the entire certification process. In such cases, 
the parent company must revise its time-bound plan, and the CB must approve all changes. 
However, this multi-phase approach also benefits participants since members can, for 
example, vote on P&C revisions before they achieve full certification. 
The SAN cattle certification program requires full certification before producers are allowed 
to place the Rainforest Alliance Certified™ seal on their products, and the SAN does not have 
a governance entity analogous to the RSPO roundtable within which producers can 
participate. In addition to an individual certification, the SAN offers group certification, 
through which a number of farms (whether under the same owner or same community) can 
seek certification collectively. Group certification lowers the cost per production unit, but also 
poses risks to the group since if one entity is not compliant, all entities will be considered 
non-compliant. The JD group, which operates Fazendas São Marcelo and other farms, has 
received group certification. 
While the RSPO certification program allows individual subsidiaries to be certified in the 
interim while a producer works to gain certification for all of its subsidiaries, the SAN cattle 
certification program does not have this provision. This restriction may dampen the 
willingness of new producers to join the SAN cattle certification program. Meanwhile, 
leading conservation NGOs question the RSPO program’s credibility because participants can 
achieve certification before all of their units of production are in compliance with standards.  
3.4. Monitoring and enforcement 
Certification programs are able to successfully translate goals into outcomes by developing 
auditing procedures to track participant progress towards the fulfillment of their sustainability 
commitments. The auditing procedure implemented by CBs creates a monitoring mechanism 
to determine whether producers are faithfully executing the principles behind the standards. 
Enforcement occurs if producers fail to comply. Successful completion of these two 
components of the program verifies that standards are being met and that the final certified 
products are distinguishable from non-certified counterparts.  
The auditing procedures for both certification programs were similar in that they included 
third-party assessors. The credibility of audits is central to the legitimacy and credibility of 
certification programs. The governing body accredits these independent assessors, and only 
accredited CBs can conduct audits. While strict, quantifiable assessment methods using 
templates and checklists provide accurate and precise information about participants’ efforts; 
they also create opportunities for producers to limit their fulfillment of standards to pro forma 
treatments of the P&C. This can be problematic for instance, when dealing with local 
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communities, when a more in-depth and considered engagement is more appropriate. 
Potential conflicts of interest also arise since producers are responsible for funding the 
assessments conducted by the CBs. 
Distinguishing sustainable products from their non-sustainable counterparts is challenging, 
especially when there are no quality attributes to differentiate sustainable versions of the 
product. Voluntary certification programs ‘re-qualify’ the value of products based on the 
sustainability of production processes, as opposed to innate differences such as taste, size, or 
hardiness (Buller & Morris, 2004). Consumer confidence in the declared sustainability of a 
producer or product is thus dependent on verification mechanisms to ensure strict compliance 
(Guthman, 2007). 
In the RSPO certification scheme, CBs are responsible for enforcement. They assess whether 
participants are compliant and then report their findings and any major nonconformities to the 
roundtable. The RSPO’s complaint system is available to both internal and external 
stakeholders to report participants’ suspected noncompliance (RSPO, 2012). Failure to 
address minor nonconformities can result in the RSPO elevating the issue to a major 
nonconformity and may lead to suspension and permit revocation if not resolved in a timely 
manner (RSPO, 2007). However, civil society groups have criticized the RSPO’s enforcement 
mechanism for a lack of transparency, delays in initiating investigations, and weak 
consequences for noncompliant participants (Greenpeace, 2013). Rather than restrict 
themselves to the RSPO system many of these groups have chosen to pursue redress in other 
forms, such as consumer awareness campaigns, boycotts, and direct engagement with 
producers. 
In the SAN cattle certification program, independent CBs track the sustainability performance 
of producers via a cycle of one full audit followed by two annual less-exhaustive audits. After 
three years, the producer must undergo a full audit again. The CBs encourage producers to 
strive for continuous improvement with respect to the number of criteria achieved. Each 
country’s CB either conducts the audit itself or contracts with an authorized third party to 
complete the audit. The CB does not provide recommendations or technical assistance about 
the changes needed for producers to meet the criteria, but can clarify the criteria and whether 
they have been met. 
The main challenge of enforcement is that strict rulings often are at odds with the interest of 
the program to achieve scale by maintaining and expanding the pool of participants. Programs 
are loath to revoke certification at the risk of diminishing already limited or fragile participant 
buy-in, but they must also maintain their commitments to enforcement to the extent necessary 
in order to satisfy external stakeholders as to their credibility.  
4. Discussion 
Voluntary certification programs seek to maintain the rigor of sustainability standards while 
increasing participation from commodity producers. These two factors are amongst the 
primary drivers determining the sustainability impact of a program compared to a business-
as-usual scenario in which the program did not exist. Design of the activities (standards 
setting, adoption, implementation, monitoring and enforcement) that comprise a voluntary 
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certification program offer, to different extents, opportunities to provide benefits to 
stakeholders. These opportunities to provide benefits to stakeholders can balance the often-
competing goals of rigor and scope. In lieu of a price premium, which is often unavailable in 
many voluntary certification programs (Klooster, 2006), program designers can structure the 
activities of the program to generate non-monetary benefits for its participants. At its core, 
offering incentives to secure participation relies on an exchange of benefits between the 
various stakeholders in a program: a demonstrated commitment to the standards of the 
program is needed to satisfy civil society groups and consumers, and in turn, the bestowal of 
certification secures for participants benefits such as market access and risk protection. 
Precisely what kinds of benefits compliant producers gain depends on the specific activities 
of the program and how they are designed. The RSPO certification program has created an 
intermediate stage in membership that allows producers to participate in the program before 
they are fully certified. This means that benefits to producers, such as access to RSPO 
meetings, begin to accrue at an earlier stage – producers are recognized for their 
commitments prior to full compliance. Our interviews led us to conclude that choices about 
how to incentivize participation often are independent of decisions by program managers 
about how to maintain the rigor of standards. In our conversations with industry and civil 
society stakeholders, tensions about the program tended to revolve around compliance with 
the P&C and the underlying rigor of the standards themselves. We suspect that the RSPO 
system yields more benefits to producers because producers are active in the program rather 
than due to a concerted effort by program designers to balance competing stakeholder 
interests. Thus, the benefits available to RSPO-affiliated producers reflect their attempts 
through the governance structure of the program to mollify compliance challenges, from 
pushing for phased compliance to more lenient grievance systems. To be sure, producers also 
seek more relaxed P&C; however, lowering standards has its limits in terms of credibility. We 
suggest that, for instance, securing a more lenient grievance structure can net a similar result 
as lowering the standard. 
Conversely, the SAN program limited producer involvement in governance. Before the SAN 
program awards certification, producers must comply fully with rigorous standards set 
without their involvement. This dynamic reflects both the dominance of NGOs in the 
governance of the program as well as the theory of sustainability impact – that specific 
sustainability outcomes depend on the summation of producers adhering closely to standards 
as originally formulated. Broad producer participation only matters if collectively they can 
achieve the sustainability impact envisioned by the program designers as an outcome of 
following specific practices. Providing producers with benefits and other enticements for their 
participation matters little if compliance with standards is compromised or otherwise delayed. 
However, as we suggest, support for rigorous standards is underwritten with increased 
benefits to participants. Therefore, significant gains in sustainability for these programs are 
most likely to result when there is a deliberate increase in benefits to producers. Thoughtful 
design of the non-standard setting activities of the program is one avenue for providing these 
benefits to participants while still securing the kinds of commitments to rigorous standards 
that support overarching program goals for sustainability. 
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4.1. A benefits framework for the design of certification programs 
Significant sustainability impact stemming from a large number of producers adopting 
rigorous social and environmental standards is the goal of voluntary certification program 
design. For their compliance, producers are awarded certification, for which they may receive 
a range of monetary and non-monetary benefits. We wish to call attention to the role design 
plays generating these private benefits to producers, who, in turn, may be more likely to adopt 
rigorous standards, resulting in a greater sustainability impact. The SAN cattle certification 
program functions in this manner: certification is awarded only after the producer meets the 
standards requirements. In such cases, benefits are tied directly to the fulfillment of best 
practices. This choice to delay the award of private benefits until there is full and verified 
compliance is unsurprising; it is easier for programs to distinguish sustainable from non-
sustainable producers and their products (Buller & Morris, 2004; Prakash & Potoski, 2012). 
Still, fewer producers are able to participate when standards are high. In the most rigorous 
programs, the benefit to producers must be that much greater if they are to participate, and 
incrementally more so the further away they are from compliance.  
Program administers can choose to set lower standards in order to boost participation, but this 
is a suboptimal outcome. Low standards lack credibility and legitimacy, making the program 
vulnerable to competitors and criticism from civil society groups and their constituents. Low 
standards may even persist in the marketplace simply because consumers lack the ability to 
distinguish readily between voluntary standards and the plethora of eco-labels (Muradian & 
Pelupessy, 2005). Programs that find success despite a perceived lack of rigor can be 
expected to have fewer pressures to continuously improve their standards (Muradian & 
Pelupessy, 2005).  
Some programs use their design to mitigate this potential conflict between maintaining rigor 
and boosting participation. Meeting the standards is often a lengthy and complex process that 
requires significant capital investment. The RSPO program is able to generate additional 
benefits for participants by turning compliance away from a binary designation to something 
closer to a progression in which the attainment of intermediate stages is recognized and 
rewarded. In such programs, attending trainings, instituting monitoring protocols, and 
declarations to fulfill the standards are all acknowledged and may even confer privileges 
reserved only for fully certified producers in other programs. 
Involving producers in activities beyond compliance with the standards can provide 
additional opportunities to generate benefits for producers. The RSPO certification program 
draws heavily on the roundtable, using membership to provide near-term benefits to 
participants. Membership in the roundtable is considered a gateway to certification. It gives 
participants a voice in governance and other deliberations, and many external stakeholders 
recognize membership as akin, or at least generally related to, certification, albeit 
inaccurately. The RSPO certification program also permits companies to become certified 
even while some of their estates and mills are awaiting official recognition from the CB. In 
these cases, companies are required to develop and seek approval for a time-bound plan to 
achieve full certification of all their operations. At intermediate points before full compliance, 
producers are able to capture a range of non-monetary benefits from compliance with best 
practices and ancillary administrative requirements, including a full-fledged sustainability 
management system, opportunities for product marketing, first-mover advantage in markets, 
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access to finance, access to technical information, risk management, and the use of an eco-
label to distinguish their products from non-sustainable counterparts (Overdevest & 
Rickenbach, 2006; Tallontire, 2007; van Kooten et al., 2005).  
4.1.1. Producer progression to achieve the sustainability goals of standards 
programs 
Based on our findings, we identified a common trajectory that producers follow towards 
compliance with a voluntary certification program. Participants begin by building capacity 
and seeking technical assistance from consultants, civil society groups, and researchers. In a 
second phase, producers are general participants: they make efforts to achieve certification, 
but not every action leads directly to the achievement of the sustainability goals of the 
standards program. Only in the climax phase can participants make the advancements in their 
practices that feed into the broader sustainability impact of a voluntary certification program 
on its commodity sector. 
Whether this progression from capacity building, to participation, to contribution to 
sustainability is acknowledged explicitly varies with each voluntary certification program. 
Under a more straightforward program, such as the SAN cattle certification program, the 
steps taken (e.g., outlay of capital, building capacity, and seeking technical assistance) by 
would-be participants to meet standards occur without official acknowledgement by external 
stakeholders. Therefore participants who are in the earlier phases of achieving certification 
cannot recoup the full benefit from their efforts towards compliance. Producers in the 
intermediate phase may learn about best practices that increase yield and improve production. 
However, if an assessor finds that a producer’s efforts do not meet the requirements of the 
P&C, even if only for one of its production units (in the ‘participation’ phase of the 
sustainability maturation trajectory), the entire certification can be delayed. Still, the benefits 
gained from improved practices may have positive returns such as increased productivity, 
regardless of the awarded certification.  
Under the RSPO-type certification program, the program’s coupling with the industry 
roundtable is important to its potential to attract participants. The progression from member to 
certified company in the RSPO certification program ideally tracks the general progression of 
participants from capacity building, to participation, to contributing to the program’s impact. 
However, a producer’s participation in the RSPO does not necessarily have to conclude with 
full certification. Member producers can interact with civil society groups in less adversarial 
settings, giving them the opportunity to learn about and strategically position themselves in 
response to known sustainability “hotspots.” Since membership in the roundtable is at best 
seen as movement in the right direction and often confused with the achievement of 
certification, producers may benefit from the vagueness of membership status to quell 
pressures from their critics. The mechanisms for enforcement and airing grievances against 
members and certified producers is handled directly by the RSPO, which may provide 
producers with the leniency they believe is appropriate while in the early stages of 
compliance. In recognition of the complexities of certifying a diverse set of operational units 
across multiple jurisdictions, producers are also permitted to establish a time-bound plan for 
when they will achieve full certification. The shelter of general membership in the RSPO is a 
principle element in attracting producers who could not justify certification if there were not 
recognized stages for “capacity building” and “participation.”  
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Multiple intermediate stages and ways of marketing the program can serve to attract 
additional participants, but that diversity of interest in participation also has the potential to 
obscure the purpose of the program and the role of producers in it. For example, participants 
who view the RSPO’s P&C as a management system primarily may lose sight of the core 
sustainability mission to reduce deforestation. Their commitment to continuous improvement 
may be difficult to secure if future updates to the standard diverge from their original 
motivation for joining the program. Meanwhile, the SAN cattle certification program may 
attract a more limited spectrum of potential participants because it is marketed solely as 
sustainability standard, but producers may have more understanding of its purpose as well as 
a common rationale amongst producers for why they chose to participate, which can make 
support for future updates less controversial. These differences between the SAN cattle 
certification program and RSPO certification program may reflect their core constituencies: 
civil society actors drive SAN cattle certification, while RSPO certification is considered an 
industry-led program. 
4.2. Programmatic goals and credibility 
Efforts to entice producers to participate in voluntary certification programs must be balanced 
with maintaining program credibility. For the SAN cattle certification program, producer 
participation is equivalent to certification and means full compliance with the standards required 
by the program. Participation in the RSPO certification program is not so straightforward. The 
program’s support for alternative endpoints short of full certification tends to obscure the fact that 
a number of producers are not able to achieve certification (or contribute to the sustainability 
impact of the program). Sustainability-conscious consumers, financial institutions, and civil 
society groups have argued that the pairing of the RSPO certification with its roundtable leads to 
confusion over the actual progress toward sustainability of participating producers.  
The complication is that the overall goals of the program may become disconnected from 
whatever benefits producers and external stakeholders, such as civil society groups, gain from 
participating in the program. The RSPO certification program is an offshoot of the industry-led 
RSPO roundtable, and emphasis is placed on recruiting producers to become members, whether 
or not they ultimately achieve full certification. High participation rates in the roundtable would 
be considered a success given the overall organizational goal to engage stakeholders to initiate a 
dialogue about sustainability in the sector. It is not surprising that the RSPO program lacks clear 
mechanisms for moving producers through that final “phase transition” to full certification. In this 
light, a decision by the RSPO to maintain an internal grievance process is perfectly defensible; an 
internal grievance system is more likely to result in reprimands rather than outright dismissals of 
noncompliant producers, but also serves to keep more of industry in the forum for conversations 
about sustainability in the sector (Jacobson 2013). 
Despite varying goals and institutional histories, the civil society groups who lend credibility and 
legitimacy to voluntary certification programs are broadly similar. Most civil society groups have 
limited allegiance to particular programs. In fact, they often view voluntary certification standards 
as one tool among many for achieving greater sustainability in the sector. Under resource 
constraints, civil society groups may withdraw their support for the program rather than invest 
scarce time and resources in verifying the status of individual participants or working to fortify 
the program. 
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Conclusion and recommendations  
A focus on benefits to participants suggests that producers seek full certification—what is 
asked of them by external stakeholders—so long as there is sufficient benefit for doing so. 
Programs that seek to maintain less stringent sustainability standards or lower their rigor as a 
way to attract producers may find quickly that they are at an impasse: lower standards 
undermine the program’s credibility for civil society groups and other external stakeholders. 
Based on our research findings, we identify opportunities to provide incentives for producer 
participation without lowering the rigor of the standards within the principle activities of 
standards programs (standards setting, adoption, implementation, and monitoring and 
enforcement). For example, the obstacles and high initial costs for producers to comply with 
standards suggest that design choices aimed at balancing rigor and participation should focus 
specifically on ways to acknowledge intermediate stages of participation in ways that are 
credible to external stakeholders. 
Each certification program studied is challenged in its own way to make credible design 
choices that acknowledge producer efforts at earlier stages. The SAN cattle certification 
makes no distinctions between producers at varying levels of compliance with the standards. 
The program is challenged by its programmatic goals and institutional history to find 
additional and earlier opportunities to provide incentives to would-be participants while still 
maintaining the overall credibility of the program. The RSPO certification program provides 
participants with opportunities to participate at earlier points in the certification process and 
rewards efforts that other programs may regard as ancillary to certification. The challenge for 
the RSPO certification program is to develop clear and objective benchmarks for what is 
expected of producers at the intermediate points of participation, and to identify mechanisms 
to compel producers to continue to a point of full compliance with the standards. 
To successfully improve or create new programs, rigor of standards and benefits to 
participants must be considered simultaneously, as a coupled approach may offer the greatest 
opportunity to improve participation while maintaining credibility of the rigor of the 
standards. Incentives to producers should be advanced to the extent possible deliberately and 
in conjunction with the setting of higher standards. Also, introducing well-defined 
expectations about what producers must accomplish at particular milestones may help to 
reconcile the interests of the program as it interacts with both participants and civil society 
groups. More specificity about what is required of participants at these intermediate horizons 
(e.g. membership in the roundtable or time-bound plans) may decrease ambiguity about the 
efforts of participants. Producers can use intermediate points of verification to satisfy NGOs 
about their progress towards sustainability, introduce their products to additional markets, and 
justify the costs of certification. For instance, more objective and clearly-articulated 
benchmarks would circumvent issues some civil society groups have raised about the actual 
degree of conflict between the HCV area model and Indonesian law that allows the 
government to reclaim land designated for production but that is lying fallow, arguing that 
producers have established the dispute to avoid having to honor the results of a HCV 
assessment. NGOs may benefit from the ability to assess impact more granularly and more 
frequently as part of their efforts to benchmark progress toward sustainability. 
   23 
Appendix 1: List of interviews  
Table 1: Interviews conducted in Indonesia and Brazil 
Interviewee role in the organization Organization Organization sector 
Indonesia   
Researcher/Director of Agribusiness at 
Surya University 
Indonesian Center for 
Agriculture Socio Economic and 
Policy Studies, Ministry of 
Agriculture University 
Researcher 
Bogor Agricultural University 
(IPB) University 
Deputy Director - Market Transformation WWF NGO 
Global Coordinator for Palm Oil  
Palm oil campaigner for Greenpeace 
Southeast Asia GreenPeace NGO 
Palm Oil Project Manager 
Zoological Society of London 
(ZSL) NGO 
 Sawit Watch NGO 
Project Officer 
Forest Peoples Programme 
(FPP) NGO 
Senior Policy Advisor 
Forest Peoples Programme 
(FPP) NGO 
Officer AMAN NGO 
 LBBT NGO 
 YPSBK NGO 
Head of Campaign and Advocacy 
Department WALHI NGO 
National Coordinator 
Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit 
(SPKS/Palm Oil Farmer's Union) Association 
Indonesia Director RSPO Roundtable 
 
Indonesia Palm Oil Association 
(GAPKI) Industry Organization 
Consultant Daemeter Consulting Consulting 
HCV Consultant Tropenbos Consulting  
 Sucofindo Certification Body 
RSPO Scheme Manager for ASEAN 
British Standards Institute 
Group (BSI) Certification Body 
 PT Sai Certification Body 
PR, R&D, General Manager, Technical 
Manager Anonymous Producer/MNC 
Deputy Head, Sugar Cane Division Anonymous Producer/MNC 
Chief Operating Officer,  
Vice President, Corp Affairs Anonymous Producer/MNC 
Local funding manager Anonymous Producer 
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Owner, Sustainability manager Anonymous Producer 
Plant manager Anonymous Producer 
Head of Environment, Health & Safety Anonymous Producer 
Independent smallholder Anonymous 
Producer/non-
certified/smallholder 
- Anonymous Producer/non-certified/ 
- Anonymous Producer/non-certified 
Global Product Specialist - 
Environmental, Social & Trade Standards, 
Sustainable Business Advisory 
Department  
International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) Banking 
Brazil   
Agricultural Certification Imaflora NGO/SAN certifier 
Executive Director Imaflora NGO/SAN certifier 
Agricultural Certification Imaflora NGO/SAN certifier 
Cattle and Agriculture Political-
Economics Analist ICV NGO 
Executive Coordinator ICV NGO 
Project Manager ICV NGO 
Sustainable Municipality Coordinator ICV NGO 
Sustainable cattle analyst ICV NGO 
Researcher Amigos da Terra NGO 
Conservation Program Analyst WWF NGO 
Sustainable Harvests Coordinator The Nature Conservancy NGO 
Technical Manager Fazendas São Marcelo Producer 
Manager Fazendas São Marcelo Producer 
Human Resources Analyst Fazendas São Marcelo Producer 
Producer - Producer 
Producer - Producer 
Producer Fazenda Salto das Nuvens Producer 
Producer and President of the Sindicate 
Sindicado dos prodtores de Alta 
Floresta Producer 
President of Animal Protein sector AC Agromercantil Producer 
Sustainability sector Marfrig Slaughterhouse 
Quality Guarantee Marfrig Slaughterhouse 
Marfrig Club Marfrig Slaughterhouse 
Marfrig Club Marfrig Slaughterhouse 
Supervisor of Sustainability Marfrig Slaughterhouse 
Sustainability Director JBS Slaughterhouse 
Manager Carrefour Retailer 
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Sustainability Director Walmart Retailer 
Sustainability Manager Walmart Retailer 
Latin America Protein Director McDonalds Restaurant 
Executive Director 
Beef Exporters Association - 
ABIEC Association 
Technical Assistant 
Beef Exporters Association - 
ABIEC Association 
Marketing Specialist Range and Pastures Dow Industry 
Institutional Relations Dow Industry 
Executive Coordinator GTPS Roundtable 
Director Acrimat Producer Association 
Post-Doctoral and FSC auditor FEA/Imaflora Researcher/Auditor 
Environmental Analist IBAMA Government 
Researcher Embrapa Government 
 Secma 1 Government 
 Secma 2 Government 
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